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In this paper, I quantify the role of media in the formation of support for unemploy-
ment insurance. Theory suggests that individuals who feel threatened by globalization
demand compensatory policies. Using a novel method of quantitative text analysis, I
derive measures on the stance to globalization for all major British newspapers between
2001 and 2005. Results of regressing individual demand for unemployment insurance on
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1 Introduction
Globalization has been one of the predominant forces in shaping the global economy over the
last decades.1 With falling transportation costs, reduced barriers to trade, and rapidly growing
access to the internet and other communication devices, global economic integration can be
expected to intensify even further in the years to come. Although trade theorists seem to
agree that economic integration and resulting specialization is overall beneficial,2 this view
is not shared by the entire public sphere. Increasing exposure to (perceived) income risks
due to globalization triggers demand for compensating welfare policies as propagated by the
compensation hypothesis (cf. Cameron 1978; Rodrik 1998). However, governments may find it
hard to finance these welfare policies since economic integration also imposes limits on their
ability to levy taxes on capital or mobile high-income earners. Understanding to which extent
deepening economic globalization affects the demand for welfare policies and on which particular
social groups these changes in demand concentrate is thus an essential prerequisite for assessing
the sustainability of welfare systems.
This paper contributes to understanding these mechanisms by analyzing the effects of media
consumption on the formation of voters’ demand for compensatory policies. This combination
is a novel approach since these two lines of literature have developed separately so far. On the
one hand, the literature on how globalization affects individual demand for welfare policies has
mostly focussed on the channels suggested by classical trade theory (e.g. Burgoon 2001; Cusack
et al. 2006; Rehm 2009) and more recently also on firm-level trade effects (Walter 2010). All
these papers rest on the implicit assumption that individuals are able to quantify the effect of
globalization on their incomes when having trade theories and trade statistics at hand.
On the other hand, there is a recent line of research highlighting the impact of media
reporting on individual behavior as well as on aggregate policy outcomes. Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2004), e.g., study in a seminal paper how media reporting affects individuals’ views
on the US and on 9/11. La Ferrara et al. (2012) stress the importance of media consumption
for fertility decisions. At the aggregate political level, Strömberg (2004) shows an impact of
radio access on public spending in US regions and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) estimate the
effect of FoxNews on Republican vote shares.3 These papers reveal considerable effects of media
reporting on both individual opinions and aggregate policy outcomes in a variety of settings.
Therefore, there is good reason to expect media reporting on economic globalization to affect
individual demand for compensating welfare policies. If this turns out to be the case, this gives
us a far more comprehensive understanding of how globalization is going to shape size and
scope of welfare systems.
Accounting explicitly for the policy position of the media consumed by individuals is the
1Throughout this paper, I use the terms globalization and (international) economic integration interchange-
ably, cf. Rodrik (2000).
2Compare Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) for a dissenting position.
3Further related literature is Prat and Strömberg (2005); Knight and Chiang (2011); Gerber et al. (2009);
Durante and Knight (2012); Faccini and Mayda (2009) with a focus on individual opinions and e.g. Gentzkow
(2006); Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2009) with a focus on aggregate political outcomes. Prat and Strömberg
(2011) provide a comprehensive survey on this line of literature.
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second main contribution of this paper. Most of the papers mentioned above look at rather
crude measures for media consumption, such as newspaper dummies, media availability, or the
coverage frequency of a certain topic.4 When using such measures, the effect of the exposure to
media on political outcomes is unclear from a theoretical perspective, since the precise position
of a media outlet is unknown. Often, implicit assumptions on relative positions of media outlets
are made. Such assumptions seem to be justified when we are concerned with broad left-right
effects. However, such assumptions are far less convincing in settings with several media outlets,
several time periods, or topics rarely covered in the media.
The third main contribution of this paper consists in the construction of reliable and repli-
cable measures for the stance of British newspapers towards globalization. The necessity to
collect this data is a direct consequence of the previous argument. To collect the data, I rely on
a method of quantitative text analysis propagated by Laver et al. (2003) and used by political
scientists to analyze the political positions of party manifestoes and political speeches.5 The
statistical algorithm implemented by Laver et al. (2003) in their wordscores-routine creates
objective and time-variant measures for topic-specific policy positions by comparing word fre-
quencies in the dataset with those in so-called reference texts. These measures can be targeted
to specific policy issues and thus go far beyond crude left-right categorizations. Applying this
method to all newspaper articles on globalization in 10 major British newspapers between 2001
and 2005, I find strong support for my initial assertion that the general policy slant of a news-
paper is not a good indicator for the position of a newspaper towards globalization since these
two measures are neither highly correlated nor are newspapers’ positions stable over time.
Being the first paper to control explicitly for the endogeneity of media consumption is the
fourth main contribution of this paper. Most prior research, though in principle aware of the
issue, has not tackled this point so far. However, when individuals choose to read newspapers
which perfectly meet their prior opinion on an issue, most of the correlation is caused by reverse
causality. Since such selection is most likely at work, it is important to control for it and to
quantify the effect. In this paper, I thus instrument for the individual newspaper choice by
regional readership characteristics. As it turns out in the empirical investigations, endogeneity
is an issue in the data. Interestingly, the quantitative impact of endogeneity is by far larger
when measuring the newspaper position in the traditional way by newspaper dummies than
when using the new data collected for this paper. This result lends additional relevance to my
research strategy.
The analysis requires linking individuals to the content of media information they consume.
This is non-trivial in practice since hardly any survey on media consumption behavior collects
the data on the socio-economic background of respondents which is necessary to control for
economic effects of globalization. Due to the highly concentrated newspaper market in the UK,
4The coverage frequency is a crude measure for the so-called first-level agenda-setting. According to the
theory of first-level agenda-setting, more exposure to media leads to the formation of any opinion.
5The first paper in economics that goes this way is Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010). Using methods of quanti-
tative text analysis in the vein of Laver et al. (2003) they estimate measures for the overall left-right orientation
of 433 US newspapers in 2005.
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however, large-scale surveys such as the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) include ques-
tions on newspaper readership behavior. I use this exceptional dataset both to link newspaper
readership to an individual and to control for economic effects of globalization at the individual
level. Due to limitations in the availability of newspaper data and major economic control
variables, I have to restrict the time-span of the investigation to the period 2001 to 2005.
Linking the measures for newspaper content to individuals in the BSAS dataset, I find evi-
dence for the existence of an impact of media reporting on individual demand for unemployment
insurance. This effect is economically significant: Moving from the most globalization-sceptical
newspaper (The Star in 2002) to the most globalization supporting one (The Express in 2005)
reduces the likelihood to favor an expansion of unemployment benefits by about 11 percent in
the baseline regression. The inclusion of both individual socio-demographics and controls for
trade effects does hardly affect this magnitude. Furthermore, coefficients are slightly smaller
(by one percentage point) when accounting for self-selection into readership, but remain both
statistically and economically significant. The effect of being a supporter of the Labour Party
rather than non-partisan, e.g., is of comparable magnitude. Hence, the effects of media on the
formation of demand for compensating policies need to be taken into account when investigat-
ing how globalization is going to shape welfare systems.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, I discuss why we can expect reporting
on economic globalization to have an effect on individual demand for welfare policies. In the
third section, I present the data used in the empirical investigations, give a brief introduction
into methods for quantitative text analysis, and explain how the text measures used in this
paper are derived. Section four presents and discusses the empirical findings. The final section
summarizes results and highlights its implications.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 The Role of Media in Shaping Policy Attitudes
Communication scientists distinguish two channels through which mass media influences in-
dividual opinions.6 The first one is labeled first-level agenda-setting (cf. McCombs and Shaw
1972). This channel relates to the frequency of reporting on a certain issue. The underlying
theoretical argument is that more frequent reporting leads individuals to reflect more intensely
on a certain issue and thereby induces them to form an opinion. Put differently, the more often
media reports on a certain issue, the lower the likelihood to find an individual without any
opinion on that topic. However, according to this theory, the reporting frequency has no effect
on which opinion is formed.7
6See Protess and McCombs, eds (1991) for a broad survey.
7Testing this theory requires to check whether reporting intensity has an effect on the likelihood to form
any opinion. The BSAS data does indeed allow respondents to state that they have no opinion on whether
unemployment benefits should be increased or decreased. However, none of the undecided reads a newspaper,
making it impossible to test this theory with present data. See Gerber et al. (2009) and Oberholzer-Gee and
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The role of media in the formation of specific opinions in known as second-level agenda-
setting (Lopez-Escobar et al. 1998; Golan and Wanta 2001). This part of the theory postulates
that consumption of media transmits attribute salience to the reader, i.e. media content shapes
the way a reader thinks or feels about a certain issue.
In this paper, I want to test whether media consumption affects individual support for
unemployment insurance, i.e. I am interested in which opinion readers form. Therefore, my
analysis is more closely related to second-level agenda-setting and I have to use a measure of
the relevant newspaper content in the empirical analysis.
In addition to these theoretical arguments, there is a wide range of empirical articles showing
that media has an impact on individual actions and beliefs. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) show
that the access to a TV network (AlJazeera or CNN) shapes the view of individuals on 9/11
in Arab countries. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) use random variation in the availability
of Fox News to estimate the effect of exposure to Fox News on vote shares of Republican
Candidates. La Ferrara et al. (2012) focus on rather long-lasting effects of media consumption:
Using random variation in access to a TV station in Brazil, they show that changes in the
family size in telenovelas have an impact on fertility decisions.
A further important issue is whether media reports in an unbiased way. If media reports
in an unbiased way, then a priori we cannot make a clear statement on whether media has
an effect on demand for compensation in addition to the effects described by trade theories:
Media reporting might just serve as a perfect substitute for calculating the labor market effects
according to economic theory. This concern is of particular relevance in settings without random
variation in newspaper access such as the one used in this paper.
From a theoretical point of view, an independent additional effect of media seems to be
plausible for several reasons: First, media has an incentive to over-report on bad news (”bad
news is good news”), intensified by the fact that losers are often more visible than winners.8
Second, media reporting might be plainly biased to meet readers priors.9 Third, consumers of
mass media are far too heterogeneous to allow the media outlet to give accurate and precise
information on the economic prospects for every single individual among them – mass media
requires generalizations and simplifications.
There is some literature providing empirical evidence on biased reporting of newspapers.
Puglisi (2011) uses data on how often The New York Times reported on issues either ”owned”
by Democrats or Republicans between 1946 and 1997 and finds evidence of a more favorable
reporting on topics ”owned” by Democrats if the presidential incumbent is a Democrat. Using
data on 140 US newspapers endorsing either the Democratic or the Republican presidential
candidate, Larcinese et al. (2011) find that a similar pattern applies to articles on economic
issues in the period 1996 to 2005.
In summary, there is evidence that media reporting is able to influence individual policy
Waldfogel (2009) for implicit tests of this theory.
8In some circumstances, media might overreport on those who gain, e.g. on corporate gains due to exports.
However, this does not affect the validity of this argument since it only changes the sign of the bias.
9This argument has been derived in theoretical models by Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006). An early paper presenting empirical evidence on this matter is Lord et al. (1979)
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attitudes in general. In the empirical analysis, I have to establish that this general relationship
also holds true for the relationship between media reporting on economic globalization and
individual demand for social welfare policies. Second, I have to test whether newspapers serve
as a perfect proxy for economic effects, or whether there is an independent effect of newspaper
content. In the former case, the estimated effect of newspaper content decreases considerably
once I control for direct trade effects. If newspaper reporting contains different or additional
information, however, coefficients stay much more stable.
2.2 Globalization and Demand for Welfare Policies
Testing whether newspaper content has an impact on individual attitudes in addition to pure
economic effects requires accounting for these economic effects. Therefore, I discuss in this
section alternative factors changing individual attitudes towards the provision of unemployment
insurance with a focus on the labor market effects of economic integration.
In general, the objective of welfare policies such as unemployment insurance is either to
redistribute income, to provide insurance, or a mixture of both. To understand how globaliza-
tion influences individual attitudes towards these policies one therefore has to think about the
impact of economic integration on both the level and the volatility of incomes.
A first line of argumentation focusses on the redistributive role of welfare policies. In addi-
tion to socio-demographic characteristics (compare e.g. Alesina and Giuliano (2010)), income
expectations are found to play a major role in the formation of demand for redistribution.10.
The role of income expectations is of importance since both classical trade theories such as
Heckscher-Ohlin or Ricardo-Viner models and more recent models in the fashion of Yeaple
(2005) entail relatively clear-cut predictions on who can expect to gain and who to lose when
economic integration intensifies: Income gains and losses are distributed along education levels
as well as sectoral and occupational affiliation. Since these cleavages are quite sticky at the in-
dividual level, forward-looking rational individuals are able to calculate the impact of economic
integration on their future incomes and therefore to adjust the attitude towards redistribution
appropriately.
Another line of argumentation deals with the effect of economic integration on the demand
for publicly provided insurance. These arguments are based on the literature on the so-called
compensation hypothesis (Rodrik 1997, 1998). An important assumption in these papers is that
economic globalization does not only affect long-term income movements but also the volatility
of earnings in the short-run. In this case, risk-averse individuals facing income volatility demand
insurance against uncertain income levels. However, economic integration allows to diversify
risks.11 At the same time, it fosters a more specialized economic structure and facilitates the
transmission of foreign shocks into the domestic economy. Since these effects push the volatility
of earnings in opposite direction, the overall volatility-reducing effect of economic integration
10This argument has been modeled theoretically by Benabou and Ok (2001) and tested empirically by Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005).
11Cf. Rodrik (1998, p.1021).
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needs to be assessed empirically. In a related paper, Kim (2007) is able to show that external
risk as measured by the volatility of terms of trade, net trades volumes, and exchange rates
increases the volatility of domestic variables such as per capita and aggregate values of income,
consumption, and investment in a panel of 175 countries between 1950 and 2002.
Another source of risk is created by the potential to offshore jobs. Blinder (2009) analyzes
the offshorability of jobs using detailed US labor market data for 950 different occupations in
2004. He shows that there are sizeable differences in the potential to offshore jobs and that
highly offshorable jobs were ceteris paribus paying significantly lower wages even though the
potential offshoring had not yet materialized. In a related study, Senses (2010) uses US plant-
level data between 1972 and 2001 to investigate the relationship between the offshorability of
occupations and the elasticity of labor demand. She finds evidence for a positive relationship
between the offshorability and the elasticity of the corresponding labor demand implying an
increased income risk in offshorable occupations.
On a micro-level, several aspects of both lines of argumentation have been tested to date
(e.g. Burgoon 2001; Cusack et al. 2006; Rehm 2009). Walter (2010) tests the entire chain of
the compensation hypothesis empirically using Swiss data from the 2007 wave of the World
Values Survey. She shows that individuals who are either negatively affected by international
economic integration according to the predictions of both Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner
models or who work in highly offshorable occupations are more likely to express feelings of job
insecurity. Second, this perceived insecurity translates into a higher demand for governmental
activity in the economy and in a higher propensity to vote for left-wing parties.
This evidence suggests that the labor market effects of economic integration have an influ-
ence on individuals’ demand for unemployment insurance: Individuals exposed to deteriorating
labor market prospects increase their demand for compensatory policies. To disentangle these
economic effects of integration from the effects of newspaper reporting I therefore have to control
for the individual labor market effects of economic integration according to these theories.
3 Methods and Data
3.1 Measuring Newspaper Reporting: Quantitative Text Analysis
Assessing the impact of media reporting on individual decisions requires the measurement of
newspapers’ positions towards globalization. Applying a method of quantitative text analysis
allows to generate time-varying topic-specific measures of newspaper positions. Similar methods
have been used in political science for some time to quantify political positions of texts. The
quantitative analysis of texts is based on the so-called salience theory, which assumes that
parties do not compete by directly opposing each other on the same issue but by stressing
different policy positions in their manifestoes.
The method used in this paper to infer policy positions from newspaper articles is the
so-called Wordscores method proposed by Laver et al. (2003).12 It treats the frequency at
12See Lowe (2008) and Martin and Vanberg (2008) for further information on the Wordscores procedure.
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which words occur in a text as unit of information. Using word frequencies from texts with
known policy position, so-called reference texts, each word gets assigned a parameter value,
the wordscore. The values of the wordscore are chosen to maximize the likelihood that the
sum of all products of wordscores and word frequencies meets the known policy positions of
the reference texts (textscores). The set of wordscores derived for every single word is then
applied to the word frequencies of the texts to be analyzed –so-called virgin texts– to predict
their policy positions.13 An example for how the algorithm works is provided in Appendix B.2.
This method has two major advantages compared to previously used methods of hand-
coding: First, it is less time-consuming. Second, it is more objective since scores obtained
via hand-coding rely on decisions made by the coder.14 On the downside, this method does
not allow to analyze and compare texts in different languages. This caveat, however, is of no
importance in the context of this paper.
I apply the Wordscores method to all articles on economic globalization that have been
published in major British newspapers in the years 2001 to 2005.15 In order to increase the
reliability of the obtained textscores, I carefully choose the articles included in the dataset and
diligently remove all spelling mistakes and every annotation added by the provider of the articles
from the texts.16 As reference texts I choose all election manifestoes of the three major British
parties in the years 1992-2005.17 Due to the work done by the Comparative Manifesto Project
(Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006), we have reliable information on the location of
these manifestos on a uni-dimensional scale measuring the parties’ stance towards free trade.
The party attitude towards free trade is the one among all categories in the CMP dataset
which comes closest to the standard notion of economic integration. The positions of the party
manifestoes are displayed in Table 1:
Table 1: Position of Election Manifestoes on Free Trade
1992 1997 2001 2005
Conservative Party 0.30 -0.55 -0.55 0.00
Labour Party -0.20 -0.72 -0.60 0.00
Liberal Democrats 0.00 0.12 -0.17 -0.10
The matrices containing the frequencies of words in the texts are called word-count ma-
trices. When constructing the word-count matrices, Wordscores allows to choose either single
words or groups of words as unit of analysis. Since compound words are quite rare in the
English language, I perform the analysis treating groups of either two (bigrams) or three words
(trigrams) as unit. Resulting textscores for both bigrams and trigrams are presented in Table
2. These textscores constitute the main explanatory variable in my empirical analysis.
13To get an intuition, the reader may want to think of the first step as a maximum likelihood estimation with
the textscore of the reference text on the left hand side, and the word frequencies on the right-hand side. The
second step then corresponds to an out-of-sample prediction.
14There are quite stringent guidelines on which groups of words have to be coded in which way, so called
dictionaries, involved in this process. However, some discretion of the human coder is necessarily present.
15All newspapers are listed in Table 2.
16More details on the precise procedure are given in Appendix B.1.
17These are provided by Pennings and Keman (no date)
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Table 2: Textscores from Wordscores Procedure
Textscores
Newspaper MondoTimes 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Express Conservative -0.16 -0.16 -0.26 0.10 0.62
Mail Conservative -0.29 0.06 0.03 0.34 0.05
Mirror Leans left -0.25 0.29 0.44 0.20 -0.39
Star Leans right 0.43 -0.61 0.06 -0.02 0.05
Sun Leans right -0.26 0.09 -0.14 0.47 0.28
Telegraph Leans right -0.30 -0.07 -0.15 0.19 0.21
Guardian Leans left -0.41 -0.29 -0.06 0.02 0.04
Independent Leans left 0.07 0.14 -0.43 0.12 -0.54
Times Leans right -0.26 0.03 0.35 -0.13 -0.30
Record Leans left -0.39 0.30 0.44 0.03 -0.31
Transformed textscores derived jointly from bigrams and trigrams using
Wordscores-method from Laver et al. (2003). MondoTimes is a time-invariant
measure of the overall political slant of a newspaper.
The values of the textscores need to be interpreted in comparison to the positions of the
reference texts in Table 1. To give an example, the Express is almost as globalization sceptic
in 2001 (textscore: -0.16) as the Liberal Democrats in their election manifesto (-0.17), whereas
the Record (-0.39) is quite in the middle between the positions of the Liberal Democrats (-0.17)
and the Conservative Party (-0.55) in 2001.
Between 2001 and 2004, newspapers move on average by almost two standard deviations to
more globalization-endorsing positions. In 2004 the British labor market has been opened to
workers from new Eastern European member states of the European Union. This policy change
led to public concerns about adverse labor market effects. These concerns are reflected in the
drop in average enthusiasm for globalization in newspapers in 2005.
Looking a single newspapers over time, it catches the eye that up-market newspapers report
in a comparatively stable and globalization-sceptic way, whereas low-market papers have a more
affirmative view on globalization, although reporting is far less stable over time. Although
these differences are not statistically significant, the results on the stability of reporting are not
unexpected.
There are two aspects to keep in mind: First, the position towards globalization is not
related to the general political orientation of a newspaper. Second, reporting of newspapers is
not stable over time. These findings support my initial assertion that time-invariant measures
of general political slant or newspaper dummies do not fully capture the newspaper content an
individual is exposed to. This problem is aggravated the longer the time horizon of the study
and the less important the topic for general newspaper orientation.
3.2 Survey Data
The other main source for the data I use in this paper is the British Social Attitudes Survey
(BSAS). The BSAS contains representative repeated cross-sections of the British population
(approximately 3500 adult respondents each) and has been conducted by the National Centre
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for Social Research on an annual basis since 1983. A wide range of information concerning
social attitudes, beliefs, and values is provided for each respondent. Furthermore, standard
socio-economic information on each participant has been collected.
In addition, the data set contains a wide range of questions related to the desired scope of
various governmental social welfare programs including a question which specifically deals with
respondent’s opinion on the size of unemployment insurance:
Opinions differ about the level of benefits for unemployed people. Which of these
two statements comes closest to your own view? Benefits for unemployed people
are too low and cause hardship or, benefits for unemployed people are too high and
discourage them from finding jobs?
Agreement with the first statement is coded as one, the second one as zero. In this study, the
answer to this question is used as dependent variable.
Despite the absence of a panel structure, the BSAS data set is particularly valuable for this
study due to the rich set of variables on media consumption habits. The media variable I use
in this paper provides information on the newspaper read by the respondent. This readership
indicator allows to link newspapers’ positions on economic integration to the individual level
data of the BSAS. Since this question has been asked in every wave of the survey, I can look
at a lot of time periods allowing me to exploit both variation within newspapers over time and
between newspapers.
4 Empirical Results
Based on the previous discussion of determinants of attitudes towards unemployment insurance,
estimation equations take in general the following form:18
insuranceijkt = α + β · newspaperpositionjt + trade′itγ + x′itδ +m′ktη + νj + µt + ijkt
where insurance is the attitude towards unemployment insurance, newspaperpositionmeasures
the policy slant of a newspaper, trade is a vector of various measures of the economic impact
of globalization, and x represents a vector of individual level control variables. m is a vector
of macroeconomic conditions, and µt and νj are time- and newspaper fixed effects, respectively.
Finally,  is the error term. Subindex i denotes an individual, subindex j a newspaper, subindex
k a region within the UK, and subindex t a year. Naturally, out of all parameters β, γ, δ, and
η the focus of interest is on the parameter value of β, i.e. the impact of newspaper reporting.
Since the main explanatory variable newspaperpositionjt varies only at the newspaper level, I
cluster standard errors at the newspaper level.
18Row vectors in bold letters.
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4.1 Baseline Results
To show that newspaper reporting affects the demand for unemployment insurance, I present
the first regression results in Table 3. The primary aim of these regressions is to reveal the
general pattern of how reporting influences policy demand.
Table 3: Baseline Regressions
Dep. Var.: Extend unemployment benefits?
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) (3.7)
newspaper position -0.258** -0.213** -0.219** -0.157*** -0.163* -0.081** -0.090***
(0.091) (0.079) (0.088) (0.028) (0.082) (0.032) (0.031)
Newspaper FE yes yes yes
Macro Controls yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
R2adj. 0.020 0.068 0.042 0.031 0.047 0.090 0.073
Obs. 7458 7458 7458 7458 7458 7458 7458
Dependent variable is binary with higher values indicating demand for higher unemployment benefits.
Linear probability models in all regressions, except for regression (3.7). Marginal effects of probit
estimation reported in regression (3.7). Clustered standard errors in parentheses u. Clustering at
newspaper level. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels denoted by *, **, *** , resp.
The first column displays results from a linear probability regression of the binary dependent
variable on the main variable of interest, the measure for newspaper’s policy position. As
predicted in the theory section, the two variables are negatively and significantly correlated.
A one standard-deviation increase in newspaperposition (i.e. a more pro-globalization stance)
is associated with a drop in the propensity to favor more unemployment insurance by almost
14 percent. However, since the range of observed values of newspaperposition is not the same
for all newspapers19 one can object that this result is driven by newspaperposition being
related to the newspaper read. Thus, I add a set of newspaper fixed effects to the regression.
Coefficients hardly change at all, although the fit increases considerably. Other candidates
for omitted variable biases are regional economic conditions20 and year fixed effects. They
have to be included in the regression if differences in labor market conditions over space or
time affect both the demand for unemployment insurance and the way newspapers report on
globalization. In this case, coefficients overestimate the true effect if macroeconomic controls are
omitted. Results in regressions three to six suggest that such effects are at work. The impact of
national variation across years is more pronounced than the one across regions within one year.
Moreover, the size of the coefficient for newspaperposition drops more when including year
fixed effects than with regional fixed effects. This is not surprising given the profound spatial
integration of the British economy, and the at least national dimension of business cycles.
Furthermore, year dummies also capture the effects of special media attention to globalization
in certain years. As shown in Figure 2 in the appendix, such media attention is apparently far
from being perfectly correlated with the economic importance of globalization.
19Compare Table 2.
20These include: regional GDP per capita, the growth rate of regional real GDP, some indicators for the
importance of high-skilled jobs in the regional economy, the regional unemployment rate, and some indicators
for the socio-demographic composition, including long-term political preferences. For more details, see Table
10 in the appendix.
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So far, I have used the linear probability estimation method. Though in principle appropri-
ate, one can argue this method to be inferior to non-linear ones such as probit in the presence of
a binary dependent variable.21 Thus, I re-estimate the last regression using the probit estimator.
As shown in regression (3.7), estimates hardly change.
In summary, this first set of regressions lends support to the main hypothesis of this paper:
Being exposed to more positive media coverage of globalization reduces demand for compen-
satory policies. However, two major aspects raised in the theory section have not been dealt with
so far: First, the choice of the newspaper might just reflect some underlying socio-demographic
characteristics such as age, income, or political orientation which are known to affect welfare
state attitudes as well. Second, the effect for newspaperposition can be expected to vanish if
information from the media is a perfect substitute for knowledge about income effects predicted
by trade theory. These two aspects will be explored in more depth in the next set of regressions.
4.2 Individual and Trade Controls
Factors such as age, gender, income, or political orientation have been identified to be ma-
jor determinants of demand for social insurance programs (Alesina and Giuliano 2010). Fur-
thermore, these variables influence which newspaper an individual reads, i.e. which value
newspaperposition takes at the individual level. Thus, including a wide set of socio-demographic
controls is vital for corroborating my previous results. In column 2 of Table 4, I add indicators
for age categories, educational degrees, income categories, gender, ethnic origin, labor force
status, and political orientation to the set of explanatory variables.
As a result, the coefficient for media content slightly decreases in size. This is the ex-
pected result when individual characteristics affect the both newspaper choice and the policy
attitude of an individual. However, the magnitude of the coefficient in previous regressions
is apparently not driven by the omission of these control variables. Compared to the results
of the previous literature, all control variables show the expected sign and are of reasonable size.
The second major concern deals with the exclusion of trade variables. As discussed in
the theory section, it cannot be ruled out that reporting of newspapers on globalization is
just a perfect substitute for knowing the income effects of globalization according to trade
theory. If this were the case, we could expect the coefficient for newspaperposition to decrease
considerably when controlling for trade effects. The more stable this coefficient, the more
additional information do newspapers contain.
Thus, I add a variable capturing the Heckscher-Ohlin effects of trade in regression (4.3). The
variable is constructed by interacting real trade flows with non-OECD countries with a dummy
for above-average educational attainment.22 Theory predicts the coefficient to have a negative
sign since qualified labor is the abundant factor in industrialized countries and thus benefits
21See Angrist and Pischke (2009, p.102) for a comparison of both methods
22See section A.2.1 in the appendix for a more detailed description of this variable and the other trade
indicators.
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Table 4: Regressions with Individual and Trade Controls
Dep. Var.: Extend unemployment benefits?
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7)
newspaper position -0.100*** -0.095** -0.096** -0.096** -0.093** -0.096** -0.096**
(0.038) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Trade controls
Heckscher-Ohlin -2.741 -2.920
(2.305) (2.242)
Ricardo-Viner adv. 0.379*** 0.353***
(0.081) (0.085)
Ricardo-Viner disadv. 0.426*** 0.400***
(0.090) (0.095)
middle offshorability -0.024* -0.027*
(0.014) (0.014)
high offshorability -0.022 -0.024
(0.019) (0.020)
(low-skilled) x (firm size) -0.074** -0.065*
(0.036) (0.034)
(medium-skilled) x (firm size) -0.078** -0.069**
(0.031) (0.029)
(high-skilled) x (firm size) -0.112*** -0.104***
(0.041) (0.038)
firm size 0.078** 0.068**
(0.033) (0.032)
Individual controls
female -0.036 -0.036 -0.035 -0.038 -0.036 -0.036
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
non-european -0.097 -0.096 -0.096 -0.097 -0.094 -0.093
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069)
unemployed 0.264*** 0.265*** 0.268*** 0.263*** 0.269*** 0.272***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066) (0.060) (0.058)
out of laborforce 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
labour 0.086** 0.086** 0.085** 0.087** 0.087** 0.086**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
libdem -0.008 -0.007 -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
conservative -0.137*** -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.135*** -0.136*** -0.135***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Age categories yes yes yes yes yes yes
Education cat. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Income cat. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Newspaper FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Macro Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2pseudo 0.074 0.133 0.133 0.134 0.134 0.135 0.137
Obs. 5834 5834 5834 5834 5834 5834 5834
Dependent variable is binary with higher values indicating demand for higher unemployment benefits. Marginal effects
of probit estimation reported in all columns. Clustering at newspaper level. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1
percent levels denoted by *, **, *** , resp.
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from intensifying trade relations. The coefficient shows the expected sign in the regressions,
although it is not significant at conventional levels. More importantly, the coefficient for the
newspaper-content variable is virtually unaffected.
In regression (4.4), I test for the implications of the Ricardo-Viner model by adding dummies
for being employed in industries with a revealed comparative advantage or disadvantage.23 The
coefficients show a lower demand for compensatory policies if individuals work in sectors favored
by trade, although the difference is not statistically significant.24 Again, both the coefficient
for the textscore as well as the socio-demographic controls hardly change.
Indicators for the offshorability of an individual’s occupation are included in regression
(4.5).25 According to theory, individuals demand higher protection against labor market risk
when facing a greater risk of having their job being offshored, i.e. all coefficients should be
positive and increasing in offshorability. The predicted ordering is indeed present in the esti-
mates, although the signs are not correct. There are two explanations for this finding. The
first one is the way in which the omitted category is constructed. Blinder (2009) lists only
those occupations he estimates to be offshorable, assuming that all other occupations are not
offshorable. First, this is difficult to transfer to countries using another occupational coding
than the US. Second, the degree of offshorability need not always be the same as in 2004.26
Both factors lead to a possibly imprecise composition of the control group.27 Turning to results
for other variables, the coefficients for the main variables of interest continue to show the same
pattern as before.
The more recent trade literature emphasizes the role of firms in international economic
exchanges.28 The results of this literature suggest that intensifying international trade deteri-
orates employment prospects and wages in particular for workers of intermediate skill levels,
whereas individuals with high ability can expect to improve along these two dimensions. Fur-
thermore, this literature demonstrates that larger firms firms are more active in international
economic exchange. To capture this effect, I include indicators for high, middle, and low edu-
cation into the regression and interact them with a measure for the size of the workplace, i.e.
the number of employees at the workplace of the respondent. The interaction terms are the
coefficients of interest. From theory, we can expect positive effects for medium-skilled respon-
dents (i.e. higher demand for compensation) and a negative one for the high-skilled. However,
the effects for medium-skilled respondents show a negative sign and are significant. This result
casts doubts on whether the chosen empirical adaption of the theory might be too stylized to
sufficiently explain real world labor market observations. However, there are to date no better
rationalizations of these effects available. Coefficients on the variable measuring newspaper
23Compare AppendixA.2.1 for a description of the indicator variables.
24Both coefficients show a positive sign, what is due to the fact that the omitted category is made up of all
respondents not employed in an exporting industry, including service and public sector employees.
25The highest category in Blinder’s dataset, ”offshore4”, consists of very few and specialized occupations which
are not present in my dataset.
26See Section A.2.1 for a description of the variable.
27As a side remark, Geishecker (2008) shows that employment risk of German workers due to offshorability
varies considerably by job duration. In this analysis, I cannot account for this effect.
28Compare e.g. Yeaple (2005); Helpman (2010)
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impact as well as other controls remain quite stable in terms of size and significance.
In the final regression I simultaneously test for all four trade effects. Both in terms of signs
and magnitude as well as significance no remarkable changes occur with respect to previous
regressions.
In summary, these results lend empirical support to the assertion that effects of newspaper
reporting exist in addition to real trade effects. However, I cannot assess whether newspapers
report in a deliberately biased way or whether the heterogeneity of readers does not allow them
to transmit accurate information on individual labor market effects of globalization.
4.3 Self-selection into Reading a Specific Newspaper
A natural reason to be cautious about previous results is related to the non-random allocation
of individuals into newspaper readership. If readers choose their newspaper according to how
it reports on globalization,29 then we face a problem of reverse causality since policy attitudes
influence the newspaper content an individual is exposed to.30 In this case, media content just
re-enforces prior beliefs instead of shaping opinions:31 The unadjusted coefficient for newspaper
position overstates the true effect. In the past, the literature has mostly neglected this effect.
Nonetheless, this issue ought to be dealt with appropriately. The standard way to tackle prob-
lems of reverse causality is to instrument for the potentially endogenous explanatory variable.
In this paper, I choose regional readership shares as instruments for individual newspaper
readership decisions. These measures can be expected to have an impact on individual choices,
i.e. they are valid instruments, since they relate to differences in regional availability and tastes.
However, one might fear that these effects are not strong enough, leading to a weak instrument
problem. First-stage results presented in the appendix show that this concern is not of major
relevance. It is a bit more subtle to argue that the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction,
i.e. that they do not affect individual demand for unemployment policies directly. An apparent
concern is related to Tiebout sorting. If individuals deliberately move to regions where more
people with the same opinion on unemployment insurance are living, and if these people tend
to read the same newspaper as the mover does, then this IV strategy might be problematic.
This concern seems to be particularly relevant at the level of neighborhoods or small towns.
Regions inhabited by millions of people, however, are less likely to be homogenous enough to
impair the validity of the instrument chosen.
Nevertheless, one can object that curing the problem of reverse causality has been paid with
an omitted variable bias: There may exist other factors which both affect regional readership
characteristics and individual policy preferences at the same time. Think e.g. of a region
with an industry declining due to international competition. First, inhabitants of this region
29Durante and Knight (2012) document content-based self-selection for Italian TV consumption during the
government of Berlusconi.
30It is possible that newspapers change reporting to cater to prior beliefs of its readership. Though a different
problem in economic theory, the resulting econometric problems are the same, since the cross-sectional nature
of my data does not allow me to trace individuals over time.
31Compare the theoretical models of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006).
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may want to read a newspaper with a more compassionate stance towards the workers in this
industry. Second, this decline may bolster demand for compensatory policies. One can control
for such effects by including a rich set of regional control variables which capture the economic
situation and persistent political preferences in this area. This is the approach taken in this
paper. Note that the factors which potentially affect both variables are those macroeconomic
indicators already included in the regressions before.
The lowest regional level at which the BSAS consistently provides information on the loca-
tion of respondents are the so-called Government Office Regions. For each of these 11 regions I
derive yearly regional readership shares for all newspapers in the sample from the BSAS data,
exploiting the regional representativeness of the BSAS data set.32 This set of readership shares
serves as instrument in the first stage.
Formally, the estimation procedure looks as follows: In the first stage, the newspaper read
is predicted via a set of regressions with a vector for the newspaper read on the left hand side.
This column vector contains zeros for all newspapers not read by individual i in time t and
exactly one ”one”-entry for the newspaper read. newspapershareskt represents the matrix
of instruments:33
newspaperijkt = α+ newspapersharesktβ + tradeitγ + xitδ +mktη + νj + µt + ijkt
On the right-hand side of the equation, all rows within each vector or matrix contain the same
values.
In the second stage, predicted values from the first stage are multiplied with a vector of
textscores:
insuranceijkt = α + β · newspaperposition′t · ̂newspaperijkt
+ trade′itγ + x
′
itδ +m
′
ktη + νj + µt + ijkt
Results of first-stage regressions are shown in Tables 12 and 13 in the appendix. The regional
readership ratio of a newspaper significantly increases the likelihood for a respondent to read
the same newspaper.34 The value of the F-statistic from the test on the joint significance of
all instruments is never below 60 and in most cases far above. Furthermore, the effects are of
sizeable magnitude, reducing the risk of a too weak relation even further. Other controls are
in general of expected sign and reasonable magnitude.
The second stage follows the same structure as the regressions presented in in Table 4, with
the sole difference being that I replace textscores from actually read newspapers by those from
the predicted ones. Several results displayed in Table 5 catch the eye: First, coefficients for
control variables are hardly affected by this change. Second, the coefficients for newspaper
32These readership shares are derived using the much larger original raw data-set, reducing the risk that
aggregation of too few individual data might drive first-stage results.
33Matrices are denoted in capital letters. Coefficients are not restricted to take the same value in both stages.
34Depending on the newspaper, the first stage correctly predicts the actual readership in 50 to 80 per cent of
all cases.
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Table 5: Second-stage IV estimates
Dep. Var.: Extend unemployment benefits?
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7)
newspaper position -0.083** -0.079** -0.087** -0.079** -0.079** -0.091*** -0.089**
(0.037) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.039)
Trade controls
Heckscher-Ohlin -2.987 -3.208
(2.572) (2.522)
Ricardo-Viner adv. 0.377*** 0.346***
(0.084) (0.089)
Ricardo-Viner disadv. 0.423*** 0.391***
(0.092) (0.099)
middle offshorability -0.026* -0.029**
(0.014) (0.015)
high offshorability -0.024 -0.025
(0.019) (0.020)
(low-skilled) x (firm size) -0.088** -0.080**
(0.037) (0.036)
(medium-skilled) x (firm size) -0.092*** -0.085***
(0.032) (0.031)
(high-skilled) x (firm size) -0.125*** -0.119***
(0.042) (0.040)
firm size 0.092*** 0.083**
(0.034) (0.033)
Individual controls
female -0.036 -0.036 -0.035 -0.038 -0.036 -0.037
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025)
non-european -0.098 -0.097 -0.097 -0.099 -0.096 -0.094
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.070)
unemployed 0.262*** 0.263*** 0.266*** 0.261*** 0.267*** 0.270***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.063) (0.065) (0.059) (0.058)
out of laborforce 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.128***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
labour 0.084** 0.083** 0.082** 0.084** 0.084** 0.083**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
libdem -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
conservative -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.139*** -0.136*** -0.138*** -0.137***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Age categories yes yes yes yes yes yes
Education cat. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Income cat. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Newspaper FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Macro Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2pseudo 0.073 0.133 0.133 0.134 0.133 0.135 0.137
Obs. 5834 5834 5834 5834 5834 5834 5834
Dependent variable is binary with higher values indicating demand for higher unemployment benefits. Marginal effects
of probit estimation reported in all columns. Second-stage effects reported. Clustering at newspaper level. Statistical
significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels denoted by *, **, *** , resp.
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content decrease slightly in size, gain in significance, and show by and large the same pattern
across regressions as before. These changes are as expected when selection into newspapers is
an issue and when reporting on globalization is positively correlated with the general political
stance of a newspaper.
In summary, the results of this set of regressions show that reverse causality is an issue
when estimating the effects of media content on individual policy attitudes. Accounting for
self-selection into newspapers reduces the size of estimated effects, although they remain eco-
nomically significant. The small reduction can be rationalized by the relatively low importance
of globalization for the general policy slant of a newspaper.
4.4 Self-selection into Reading any Newspaper
In the previous section, I have shown that the size of coefficients is affected, but not primarily
driven by self-selection into reading a specific newspaper. However, this analysis is conditional
on the fact that respondents read a newspaper. The number of readers has decreased con-
siderably during the period under investigation, i.e. between 2001 and 2005.35 This process
can cause an additional bias, namely self-selection into readership in general. If the decision to
read any newspaper is determined by interest in newspaper reporting on globalization, then the
effect of media content on individual attitudes which I estimate is systematically larger than
the effect in a random sample of the overall population.
To assess the empirical relevance of this concern, I check whether my measure of newspaper
reporting on globalization has an effect on the decision to read any newspaper. To that end,
I estimate an equation similar to the first-stage of the IV-estimation in the previous section,
replacing the set of dummies for reading a specific newspaper by a dummy for reading any
newspaper. Since there are necessarily also non-readers in this sample, I can no longer assign
policy positions of specific newspapers to the individual observation. As an alternative, I
generate yearly averages of newspaper policy positions, both un-weighted and weighted by
readership shares in the sample. Since both measures vary only across years,36 I cluster the
standard errors at the year-level. In neither of the two regressions, the newspaper content
measure turns out to be significant.37 However, regressions have been performed with six
clusters only, what is not sufficient to rely on asymptotic properties of the estimator. Therefore,
I re-run regressions with heteroskedasticity robust errors. In this case, asymptotics are met
although I grossly underestimate the true size of standard errors. Even in this extreme case, the
relevant coefficients are not significant at any conventional level. Taken together, these results
provide no support for an effect of my newspaper content measure on the decision whether
to read a newspaper. Reporting on globalization is apparently no source of self-selection into
general newspaper readership.
35Compare Figure 1 in the appendix.
36Thus I can no longer use year dummies. Since both the population readership share and the average policy
stance exhibit time trends, I add a linear trend to control for this effect.
37Results available on request.
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4.5 Robustness Checks
Time Structure of Effects A first concern deserving further exploration deals with the time
structure of effects. In all previous regressions I have implicitly assumed that newspaper content
instantaneously affects individual policy attitudes. However, in reality it takes some time to
process information and to update prior beliefs. Thus, I check whether the newspaper content
of the previous period has an effect on the demand for unemployment insurance. Results are
shown in Table 11 in the appendix. Since the lag structure does not allow to include observations
from year 2001, I re-estimate the last regression from Table 5 on the reduced sample. Lagged
values of the newspaper variables do not have any effect on reader’s policy attitude in any
specification. Thus, it is not restrictive to focus on contemporaneous effects.
Effects of Other Media: Internet Usage In principle, the theoretical arguments made
above apply to all kinds of media and mass information. The massive decline in newspaper
readership during the last twenty years potentially challenges my estimation strategy since
readers can obtain different information through other channels. If other media outlets report
in the same way as the newspaper read, e.g. because of common ownership or because some
media outlets simply ”follow” others, then my estimates are biased upwards and vice versa.
Unfortunately, I cannot control for the content of other media since methods like quantitative
text analysis are not available for radio and TV and associated with prohibitively high costs for
internet blogs and alike. The best proxy available in the BSAS data is information on whether
other media is consumed.
Thus, as a further robustness check I control for whether the usage of alternative media
sources affects the strength of the newspaper-content effect. The BSAS dataset allows to control
for the access of a household to an internet connection in a given year.38 The fourth regression
in Table 11 includes both a dummy for internet access and an interaction with newspaper
content. Both the coefficients for the direct as well as the indirect effect of internet usage turn
out to be insignificant. Thus, results do not support that internet usage has an impact on how
strongly newspaper reporting affects policy attitudes.
Small Number of Clusters: Wild Bootstrap In the previous regressions I have used
clustered standard errors to account for the main explanatory variable taking the same value
for every individual reading the same newspaper. However, clustering is not optimal either
since asymptotic properties of the estimator rely on the number of clusters which is only ten in
this case.39 Cameron et al. (2008) argue that the standard adjustment procedure for clustered
standard errors does not correctly state the true size of standard errors when there are only
few clusters. Instead, they propose the use of a wild bootstrap procedure as described in their
paper. Standard errors and coefficients for ”newspaperposition” derived by wild bootstrapping
are slightly smaller than those presented before. Significance and qualitative results are not
38Questions regarding TV consumption have been replaced by those on the internet in 1999.
39Compare e.g. Angrist and Pischke (2009, p.319) and Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p.829).
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affected.40
Correlation of Reporting on Globalization with Reporting on Labor Markets One
further concern can be the following one: What if reporting on globalization has no own effect
on attitudes towards unemployment insurance but rather serves as a proxy for reporting on
labor market conditions itself. Let us for a moment assume that this concern is valid. In this
case, the proxy can be either of good or of bad quality. In the good case, the correlation between
reporting on economic integration and on labor markets is highly positive. For this to hold
true, it is necessary that either a lot of articles on globalization also report on labor markets or
that the number of articles on globalization develops proportionally to the number of articles
on labor market issues. Figures 3 and 4 show that neither the first nor the second condition is
supported by the data. Alternatively, the proxy may be weak. In this case, however, the ”true”
effect of reporting on labor markets has to be extremely large and at least comparable to the
effect of individual employment status.
4.6 Alternative Measure of Media Consumption
Previous research on media effects has tested the effect of media consumption on reader’s policy
attitudes using binary information for the consumption of media in general or of specific media
outlets. From a theoretical point of view, there are two major reasons why the results from these
approaches differ from mine: First, available measures of newspaper slant are in most cases not
tailored to a specific policy, in my case to international economic integration. Second, even
when being solely interested in the general policy stance of a newspaper, available measures
such as the Mondo Times Scores are in most cases not time-varying.41 As I have shown in Table
2, positions of newspapers on specific topics vary over time and cannot be perfectly mapped
into their general policy slant. In the following estimations, I demonstrate the advantage of
using topic-specific measures rather than standard binary information of media consumption.
I re-estimate regressions (4.1), (4.2), (4.7), and (5.7), replacing the measure of globalization-
specific newspaper positions by a set of newspaper dummies. Results for this exercise are shown
in Table 6.
In the baseline regression, newspaper dummies are in general highly significant and of con-
siderable size. When including individual socio-demographic characteristics in the second re-
gression, the magnitude of newspaper coefficients decreases considerably. Thus, selection into
newspaper readership is apparently related to these characteristics. However, as the results in
the third column show, direct labor market effects of international trade are virtually orthogo-
nal to the newspaper read. In the fourth regression, I replace the dummies for the newspaper
read by the predicted readership from the first stage. Except for one case, all effects vanish
completely. Apparently, most of the correlation between newspaper dummies and reader’s sup-
port for unemployment insurance is driven by self-selection of readers into specific newspapers:
40Precise results available on request.
41Compare www.mondonewspapers.com
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Table 6: Alternative Measure of Media Consumption: Newspaper Dummies
Dep. Var.: Extend unemployment benefits?
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4)
Mail -0.010*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.151)
Mirror 0.136*** 0.035*** 0.032*** -0.077
(0.002) (0.010) (0.009) (0.146)
Star 0.113*** -0.001 -0.005
(0.006) (0.018) (0.017)
Sun 0.115*** 0.035*** 0.030** -0.063
(0.003) (0.013) (0.012) (0.154)
Telegraph 0.067*** 0.101*** 0.101*** -0.094
(0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.161)
Guardian 0.454*** 0.362*** 0.367*** 0.024
(0.004) (0.023) (0.023) (0.125)
Times 0.180*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.198*
(0.005) (0.020) (0.021) (0.118)
Record 0.120*** 0.005 -0.001 -0.142
(0.027) (0.034) (0.033) (0.134)
Trade controls
Heckscher-Ohlin -2.821 -4.833*
(2.416) (2.913)
Ricardo-Viner adv. 0.353*** 0.293***
(0.088) (0.101)
Ricardo-Viner disadv. 0.399*** 0.333***
(0.099) (0.110)
middle offshorability -0.029** -0.031*
(0.014) (0.017)
high offshorability -0.026 -0.027
(0.020) (0.018)
(low-skilled) x (firm size) -0.064* -0.047
(0.034) (0.032)
(medium-skilled) x (firm size) -0.068** -0.053*
(0.029) (0.031)
(high-skilled) x (firm size) -0.103*** -0.091***
(0.038) (0.031)
firm size 0.068** 0.051
(0.031) (0.031)
Individual controls
female -0.036 -0.037 -0.049*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
non-european -0.098 -0.094 -0.099
(0.070) (0.069) (0.063)
unemployed 0.263*** 0.271*** 0.286***
(0.065) (0.058) (0.058)
out of laborforce 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.130***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.035)
labour 0.085** 0.085** 0.105***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
libdem -0.009 -0.008 0.002
(0.031) (0.030) (0.033)
conservative -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.157***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.029)
Age categories yes yes yes
Education cat. yes yes yes
Income cat. yes yes yes
Macro Controls yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
IV yes
R2pseudo 0.073 0.132 0.136 0.119
Obs. 5834 5834 5834 5834
Dependent variable is binary with higher values indicating demand for higher
unemployment benefits. Marginal effects of probit estimation reported in all
columns. Clustering at newspaper level. Express is omitted newspaper. Statis-
tical significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels denoted by *, **, *** , resp.
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Readers self-select into reading a specific newspaper according to its general political stance,
which is in turn highly correlated with reporting on important policy domains such as unem-
ployment insurance. Calculating measures of newspaper positions on topics which are less focal
for self-selection allows to identify causal effects of media content on policy attitudes even in
non-experimental settings.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I estimate the effect of newspaper reporting about economic globalization on
individuals’ support for unemployment insurance. I use British data covering the years 2001 to
2005 which mostly stems from two data sources: First, self-collected data on the reporting of
ten major British newspapers about economic globalization. This data is derived using a novel
method of quantitative text analysis and provides reliable and replicable information on the
policy positions of newspapers based on the frequency of word occurrences in newspaper articles.
The second major source is the British Social Attitudes Survey, a large-scale socio-economic
data sets which allows to link individuals to the newspaper they read.
I obtain the following empirical results: First, the more pro-globalization the reporting
of a newspaper, the lower the support for unemployment insurance among its readers. This
result confirms theoretical predictions derived from the compensation hypothesis and theories
of media effects. The effect is of economic relevance: Moving from the most globalization-
sceptical newspaper (The Star in 2002) to the most globalization supporting one (The Express
in 2005) reduces the likelihood to favor an expansion of unemployment benefits by about 11
percent.
Second, the size of the effect is hardly affected by the inclusion of various trade controls.
Individuals can obtain information on how globalization affects their economic situation via two
channels: They can read newspapers (or consume other media) and they can directly estimate
the effects using trade statistics and trade theories. If newspaper reporting served as a proxy
for economic effects according to trade theories, then we would expect to see the coefficient on
newspaper slant declining considerably when including trade controls. However, this is not the
case. Apparently, the picture of economic globalization drawn by newspapers is not identical
with pure economic effects of integration according to trade theories.
Third, individuals self-select into newspapers with a policy position similar to their own.
Controlling for this effect in a set of IV regressions yields slightly smaller coefficients. However,
the small magnitude of this change can be explained by the relative unimportance of global-
ization for the general policy stance of a newspaper and thus for the self-selection of readers.
When accounting for self-selection in regressions with indicators for the readership itself, the
effects of newspaper dummies vanish almost completely.
These results entail several implications: First, one should be careful in choosing the ap-
propriate measure for newspaper influence. In the absence of (natural) experiments or good
instrumentation strategies, estimates can be considerably affected by self-selection. Second,
22
quantitative text analysis is a reliable way to generate measures of media positions. This is of
particular relevance when investigating the impact of reporting on a very narrow policy out-
come. Third, the way media reports on globalization has a considerable effect on the formation
of individual demand for compensation policies and thus the shape and structure of welfare
systems. Understanding the links between economic globalization and compensation policies
thus requires accounting for this effect.
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A Description of Data Set
A.1 Summary Statistics
Table 7: Summary Statistics (Raw Data)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Dependent Variable
insurance 0.4 0.49 0 1 15757
Newspaper Variables
newspaper position 0.02 0.27 -0.61 0.62 10950
Mondo Times 3.77 1.13 2 5 10950
Control Variables at Individual Level
Heckscher-Ohlin 0.03 0.04 0 0.09 23465
Ricardo-Viner adv. 0.63 0.48 0 1 23614
Ricardo-Viner disadv. 0.35 0.48 0 1 23614
middle offshorability 0.27 0.44 0 1 23614
high offshorability 0.17 0.37 0 1 23614
very high offshorability 0.01 0.12 0 1 23614
low-skilled 0.73 1.41 0 5 21234
medium-skilled 1.23 1.66 0 5 21234
high-skilled 0.87 1.58 0 5 21234
firm size 2.89 1.37 1 5 21234
female 0.57 0.5 0 1 23614
non-european 0.07 0.26 0 1 23492
unemployed 0.05 0.21 0 1 23612
out of laborforce 0.38 0.49 0 1 23612
labour 0.39 0.49 0 1 23614
libdem 0.12 0.32 0 1 23614
conservative 0.25 0.43 0 1 23614
Categorial Variables at Individual Level
age 48.85 18.13 18 99 23614
income 8.62 4.85 1 16 20503
education 4.14 2.17 1 8 23614
Macro Controls at Regional Level
real GDP per capita 17552.14 4137.18 13025.56 30042.74 23614
GDP growth 2.58 0.87 0.92 4.99 23614
employment share hi-tech 6.34 1.86 2.43 11.39 23614
employment share services 41.45 4.68 34.1 54 23614
unemployment rate 4.89 1.13 3.22 7.24 23614
population older 65 912666.88 257115.52 418000 1344600 23614
population density 775.16 1353.43 64.92 4741.35 23614
vote share conservative 34.88 8.57 18.63 46.2 23614
vote share labour 39.42 9.76 23.68 51.05 23614
vote share libdem 19.42 4.92 14.23 31.63 23614
year 2003.07 1.41 2001 2005 23614
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Table 8: Summary Statistics (Working Sample)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Dependent Variable
insurance 0.4 0.49 0 1 5834
Newspaper Variables
newspaper position 0.02 0.27 -0.61 0.62 5834
Mondo Times 3.76 1.14 2 5 5834
Control Variables at Individual Level
Heckscher-Ohlin 0.03 0.04 0 0.09 5834
Ricardo-Viner adv. 0.64 0.48 0 1 5834
Ricardo-Viner disadv. 0.36 0.48 0 1 5834
middle offshorability 0.26 0.44 0 1 5834
high offshorability 0.17 0.38 0 1 5834
very high offshorability 0 0 0 0 5834
low-skilled 0.8 1.46 0 5 5834
medium-skilled 1.32 1.7 0 5 5834
high-skilled 0.76 1.5 0 5 5834
firm size 2.92 1.37 1 5 5834
female 0.52 0.5 0 1 5834
non-european 0.06 0.24 0 1 5834
unemployed 0.04 0.21 0 1 5834
out of laborforce 0.41 0.49 0 1 5834
labour 0.42 0.49 0 1 5834
libdem 0.1 0.3 0 1 5834
conservative 0.29 0.45 0 1 5834
Categorial Variables at Individual Level
age 50.64 17.69 18 99 5834
income 8.44 4.77 1 16 5834
education 4.26 2.1 1 7 5834
Macro Controls at Regional Level
real GDP per capita 17481.8 4091.36 13025.56 30042.74 5834
GDP growth 2.31 0.66 0.92 3.54 5834
employment share hi-tech 6.43 1.92 2.43 11.39 5834
employment share services 41.36 4.71 34.1 54 5834
unemployment rate 4.95 1.14 3.22 7.24 5834
population older 65 911443.16 257268.81 418000 1344600 5834
population density 765.38 1342.26 64.92 4741.35 5834
vote share conservative 35.60 8.72 18.63 46.2 5834
vote share labour 39.62 9.64 23.68 51.05 5834
vote share libdem 19.28 4.83 14.23 31.63 5834
year 2002.92 1.4 2001 2005 5834
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Newspaper Readers
Newspaper insurance cons. libdem labour age female educ. income unemployed obs.
Express 0.29 0.45 0.14 0.26 56.68 0.52 4.34 8.22 0.03 425
Mail 0.27 0.49 0.12 0.24 54.81 0.57 4.18 9.13 0.02 1440
Mirror 0.45 0.09 0.06 0.66 53.01 0.51 4.96 6.62 0.06 1095
Star 0.43 0.13 0.07 0.50 39.47 0.39 4.69 8.11 0.07 211
Sun 0.41 0.22 0.07 0.43 45.57 0.54 4.96 7.34 0.06 1796
Telegraph 0.35 0.64 0.12 0.17 57.25 0.42 3.06 11.08 0.03 501
Guardian 0.78 0.05 0.18 0.66 45.07 0.45 1.97 11.40 0.06 344
Independent 0.70 0.06 0.32 0.43 46.57 0.34 2.62 11.55 0.05 110
Times 0.45 0.37 0.14 0.32 48.48 0.40 2.26 11.75 0.03 404
Record 0.51 0.06 0.06 0.56 51.81 0.61 5.01 6.81 0.06 160
All values are shares, unless indicated otherwise. educ. and income are ordinal indicators, with higher values of educ. indicating
a lower educational degree and higher values of income indicating a higher income.
A.2 Description of Variables
A.2.1 Construction of Trade Variables
Heckscher-Ohlin Captures the prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Interaction of (1)
total trade flows of UK with non-OECD countries in percent of UK GDP per year and (2)
qualification dummy taking the value 1 if the individual has a least an O-level qualification
(hedqual<=4), 0 else.
Ricardo-Viner adv./disadv. Measures the comparative advantage or disadvantage of an
industry in a given year. Constructed as in Mayda and Rodrik (2005, p.1410).
middle/high offshorability This variable is based on the data-set on the potential to off-
shore jobs by Blinder (2009). The index ranks 291 occupations in the US according to their
potential to be offshored using 2004 official data. All occupations not comprised in the dataset
(526 out of 817) are declared to be highly non-offshorable. Since the index is ordinal in nature,
I generate dummies for highly offshorable(index value between 100 and 75), offshorable(74-50),
and non-offshorable (49-25) occupations as suggested by Blinder (2009). Highly non-offshorable
occupations (index < 25) are the omitted category. To match these indicators to individuals in
my data set, occupational classifications have to be adjusted since occupations are coded ac-
cording to 3-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO 88) in the BSAS
and according to 6-digit SOC 2000 in Blinder (2009). Matching is carried out using correspon-
dence tables provided by the UK Office for National Statistics and the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics, respectively. In case that more than one SOC 2000 category corresponds to a ISCO
88 category, unweighted averages of offshorability scores are calculated.
A.2.2 Definition of Variables in Data Set
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B Quantitative Text Analysis: Wordscores Procedure
B.1 Selection and Preparation of Newspaper Articles for Text Anal-
ysis
All newspaper articles are obtained through the online database LexisNexis. This database
allows to select articles according to the newspaper they have been published in and the date
of publication. Furthermore, every article has been assigned to several keywords with a score
indicating the relevance of every keyword in describing the content of the specific article.42
For every newspaper and year in the dataset, I select all articles with a relevance of at least 90%
in at least one of the following categories: international trade, foreign investment, enterprise
globalization, offshoring, free trade treaties & agreements, tariffs & duties, non-tariff barriers,
protectionism, antidumping laws, export controls, import controls, foreign labor, and migrant
workers. All articles are carefully corrected for spelling mistakes. Information describing the
newspaper article that does not belong to the original article is removed. In the next step, I
construct word count matrices. The routine for Wordscores implemented within Stata allows
to construct these matrices treating either single words or groups of several words as unit of
observation. In the analysis for this paper, I construct word count matrices for groups of two
and three words. This choice reflects the rare occurrence of compound words in the English
language. Results for textscores derived using these different matrices are reported in Table 2.
B.2 Quantitative Text Analysis: An Example
This paragraph provides an example for the selection of word groups to distinguish between the
policy positions of unknown texts by the algorithm by Laver et al. (2003). Let us suppose there
are two texts, each of them consisting of one sentence. The first sentence is Unemployment is
increased by globalization and is coded as very anti-globalization, i.e. -1. The other sentence
is Unemployment is not increased by globalization and is coded as very pro-globalization, i.e.
+1. Suppose furthermore that the unit of analysis are groups of two words (so-called bigrams).
The algorithm generates the following bigrams:
Unemployment is increased by globalization -1 +1 Unemployment is not increased by globalization
Unemployment is 0 0 Unemployment is
is increased -1 +0.5 is not
+0.5 not increased
increased by 0 0 increased by
by globalization 0 0 by globalization
The algorithm focusses on bigrams which occur in only one of both texts since bigrams
which occur in both texts are useless for distinguishing the positions. Thus, it assigns the
weights to distinguish the policy positions to those bigrams which occur in only one of both
42More detailed information on the precise procedures can be obtained through the company website (http://
law.lexisnexis.com/infopro/Training-and-Resources/SmartIndexing-Resource-Center) or is available
from the author upon request.
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sentences. Bigrams occuring in both sentences receive a zero-weight. Although only one single
word changes the whole meaning of the sentence, the algorithm nonetheless identifies bigrams
which allow to draw inference on different policy positions.
B.3 Descriptive Statistics on Readership and Newspaper Reporting
Figure 1: Share of Newspaper Readers in Overall BSAS Sample
Figure 2: Reporting on Economic Globalization and Index of Economic Glob-
alization
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Figure 3: Share of articles in sample, which do not mention labor markets
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Figure 4: Ratio # articles on globalization/# articles on labor markets
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C Additional Regression Results: Robustness Checks and
First-Stage IV
Table 11: Robustness Checks
Dep. Var.: Extend unemployment benefits?
Lag Structure Internet
(11.1) (11.2) (11.3) (11.4)
newspaper position -0.121*** -0.124*** -0.099**
(0.044) (0.042) (0.040)
1.lag newspaper position 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
internet -0.029
(0.019)
(newspaper position) x (internet) -0.024
(0.053)
Heckscher-Ohlin -4.154* -3.534 -4.046 -3.124
(2.498) (2.418) (2.510) (2.489)
Ricardo-Viner adv. 0.416*** 0.420*** 0.412*** 0.348***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.086)
Ricardo-Viner disadv. 0.518*** 0.521*** 0.512*** 0.395***
(0.101) (0.100) (0.099) (0.096)
middle offshorability -0.028* -0.026 -0.028* -0.027*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
high offshorability -0.037* -0.038* -0.037* -0.024
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
(low-skilled) x (firm size) -0.040 -0.040 -0.043 -0.078**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036)
(medium-skilled) x (firm size) -0.026 -0.024 -0.029 -0.082***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.031)
(high-skilled) x (firm size) -0.072** -0.071** -0.075** -0.117***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040)
firm size 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.081**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033)
female -0.032 -0.031 -0.031 -0.036
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
non-european -0.109* -0.107* -0.108* -0.091
(0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.069)
unemployed 0.258*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.269***
(0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.060)
out of laborforce 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.127***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038)
labour 0.069** 0.071** 0.068** 0.084**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.039)
libdem 0.023 0.023 0.024 -0.005
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.031)
conservative -0.122*** -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.135***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031)
R2pseudo 0.137 0.136 0.137 0.132
Obs. 4607 4607 4607 5834
Dependent variable is binary with higher values indicating demand for higher un-
employment benefits. Marginal effects of probit estimation reported in all columns.
Second-stage effects reported. Observations from year 2000 excluded in regressions
(11.1) - (11.3). internet is a dummy for internet access in household. Clustering at
newspaper level. Age, education, and income categories, reginal macro controls, and
newspaper and year fixed effects in all regressions. Statistical significance at the 10,
5, 1 percent levels denoted by *, **, *** , resp.
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Table 12: First Stage Regressions (Part 1)
Dep. Var.: Newspaper Choice
Express Mail Mirror Star Sun
IV: Regional Newspaper Readership Shares
Express 17.629*** 4.380** -6.893*** -4.659 1.592
(2.742) (2.037) (1.597) (3.041) (2.821)
Mail 0.075 7.484*** -0.212 -1.719 -2.696*
(1.095) (0.975) (0.951) (2.053) (1.390)
Mirror -0.698 -2.242* 8.045*** 1.674 -2.900**
(1.617) (1.279) (0.982) (2.046) (1.127)
Star -2.757 -2.406 1.795 40.956*** -0.357
(3.452) (2.667) (3.255) (9.349) (4.556)
Sun -1.510 -1.504 -1.959 0.009 4.062***
(1.183) (1.597) (1.241) (2.129) (1.512)
Telegraph 0.104 -3.675*** 0.917 -3.441 -3.919**
(1.560) (1.210) (0.764) (2.590) (1.857)
Guardian 1.613 -6.095*** 6.348** -5.392 -0.893
(1.847) (1.471) (2.871) (6.411) (2.522)
Independent 4.297 1.639 8.931** 1.794 -2.851
(4.317) (2.535) (3.533) (9.000) (3.889)
Times 0.929 -3.884** -1.334 11.672** -0.901
(2.410) (1.896) (1.713) (5.469) (0.890)
Record -1.185 -2.165 0.170 2.860 -2.962**
(1.895) (1.371) (1.225) (2.307) (1.255)
Trade controls
Heckscher-Ohlin -2.957 -6.130 6.085 -0.150 3.933
(5.492) (6.005) (9.013) (7.710) (6.057)
Ricardo-Viner adv. -0.339 0.667* -0.082 -0.901 0.426
(0.293) (0.389) (0.242) (0.584) (0.489)
Ricardo-Viner disadv. -0.409 0.704* -0.095 -0.935* 0.440
(0.280) (0.383) (0.249) (0.514) (0.483)
middle offshorability 0.050 0.133*** -0.077 -0.024 -0.172**
(0.056) (0.033) (0.078) (0.131) (0.078)
high offshorability 0.089 0.158*** -0.014 -0.020 -0.181**
(0.078) (0.041) (0.049) (0.108) (0.074)
(low-skilled) x (firm size) 0.154 0.197 -0.268*** -0.341***
(0.207) (0.187) (0.095) (0.106)
(medium-skilled) x (firm size) 0.078 0.270 -0.290*** -0.087 -0.351***
(0.227) (0.179) (0.091) (0.080) (0.106)
(high-skilled) x (firm size) 0.133 0.263* -0.331*** -0.032 -0.360***
(0.211) (0.156) (0.084) (0.120) (0.131)
firm size -0.131 -0.235 0.310*** -0.004 0.347***
(0.213) (0.182) (0.079) (0.057) (0.109)
Individual controls
female 0.057 0.297*** -0.099* -0.360*** 0.016
(0.069) (0.049) (0.051) (0.070) (0.047)
non-european 0.171 0.289** 0.227* -0.269 -0.336**
(0.106) (0.143) (0.129) (0.276) (0.167)
unemployed -0.240 -0.028 0.116** -0.128 -0.340***
(0.223) (0.127) (0.055) (0.171) (0.091)
out of laborforce -0.278** -0.088 -0.057 -0.011 -0.034
(0.117) (0.090) (0.037) (0.103) (0.064)
labour -0.249** -0.183*** 0.475*** -0.066 -0.212***
(0.118) (0.070) (0.085) (0.123) (0.067)
libdem 0.247* 0.280*** 0.002 -0.346** -0.471***
(0.143) (0.046) (0.097) (0.165) (0.114)
conservative 0.160 0.420*** -0.495*** -0.406*** -0.235***
(0.122) (0.060) (0.054) (0.139) (0.062)
Age categories yes yes yes yes yes
Education cat. yes yes yes yes yes
Income cat. yes yes yes yes yes
Macro Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes
R2pseudo 0.093 0.106 0.170 0.220 0.173
Obs. 5834 5834 5834 5834 5834
Dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 when newspaper is read. Marginal effects
of probit estimation reported. Clustering at regional level. Statistical significance at the 10,
5, 1 percent levels denoted by *, **, *** , resp.
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Table 13: First Stage Regressions (Part 2)
Dep. Var.: Newspaper Choice
Telegraph Guardian Independent Times Record
IV: Regional Newspaper Readership Shares
Express -4.414 1.729 -16.011*** -0.243 177.981
(2.747) (3.907) (3.322) (2.056) (.)
Mail -2.947* -5.078** 0.602 -1.776* -40.700*
(1.564) (2.047) (2.759) (1.056) (23.417)
Mirror -4.835*** 1.234 4.408 -0.363 -88.315**
(0.955) (1.060) (3.848) (1.446) (40.454)
Star -21.168*** 8.806** 22.967*** -7.409* 56.744
(4.193) (3.477) (7.580) (4.256) (.)
Sun -3.186* 0.549 10.800*** 2.189 168.543
(1.887) (2.317) (3.116) (1.331) (.)
Telegraph 12.537*** 1.492 13.852*** 0.394 -118.732
(2.813) (2.881) (5.110) (1.110) (149.470)
Guardian 6.199* 35.620*** -12.986* 1.371 151.435***
(3.487) (6.349) (6.661) (2.615) (27.842)
Independent -1.796 0.792 50.205*** -16.603** 229.315
(5.682) (7.188) (13.128) (8.221) (216.401)
Times -9.339*** 7.525* 0.903 18.709*** 267.979***
(3.037) (4.138) (5.993) (4.116) (30.371)
Record -2.299** -0.859 5.532 -1.087 9.781
(1.144) (1.211) (4.393) (1.874) (.)
Trade controls
Heckscher-Ohlin 1.749 -7.023 10.591 3.578 49.480***
(9.461) (7.550) (10.181) (5.908) (7.279)
Ricardo-Viner adv. -0.371 -1.518*** 3.917 4.545*** 5.968***
(0.341) (0.449) (3.135) (0.973) (0.100)
Ricardo-Viner disadv. -0.249 -1.434*** 3.871 4.382*** 6.069
(0.335) (0.500) (3.155) (0.995) (.)
middle offshorability 0.173* -0.047 -0.126 0.089 0.466***
(0.096) (0.123) (0.096) (0.109) (0.071)
high offshorability 0.187*** 0.131 -0.425** 0.062 0.042
(0.068) (0.084) (0.207) (0.085) (0.168)
(low-skilled) x (firm size) -0.043 0.304* -0.010 -3.815*** -0.252**
(0.109) (0.171) (0.119) (0.916) (0.110)
(medium-skilled) x (firm size) 0.006 0.242 0.068 -3.772*** 0.206*
(0.133) (0.220) (0.124) (0.899) (0.105)
(high-skilled) x (firm size) 0.056 0.238 -0.052 -3.667*** -0.159
(0.136) (0.228) (0.064) (0.919) (0.130)
firm size -0.043 -0.283 -0.022 3.798*** 0.051
(0.139) (0.202) (0.086) (0.892) (0.105)
Individual controls
female -0.126*** -0.078 -0.281** -0.143** 0.284***
(0.045) (0.104) (0.137) (0.068) (0.081)
non-european -0.086 0.005 -0.611*** 0.224
(0.112) (0.093) (0.066) (0.178)
unemployed 0.459** 0.325 0.446 -0.156 0.201***
(0.180) (0.348) (0.483) (0.203) (0.062)
out of laborforce 0.217 -0.109 -0.224 0.199 -0.151
(0.152) (0.137) (0.139) (0.129) (0.191)
labour -0.060 0.454*** 0.135 -0.111 0.203**
(0.109) (0.160) (0.096) (0.105) (0.095)
libdem 0.239* 0.314* 0.359 0.022 -0.449*
(0.145) (0.180) (0.221) (0.131) (0.250)
conservative 0.677*** -0.531** -0.772*** 0.002 -0.482***
(0.100) (0.215) (0.164) (0.095) (0.067)
Age categories yes yes yes yes yes
Education cat. yes yes yes yes yes
Income cat. yes yes yes yes yes
Macro Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes
R2pseudo 0.093 0.106 0.170 0.220 0.173
Obs. 5834 5834 5834 5834 5834
Dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 when newspaper is read. Marginal effects of
probit estimation reported. Clustering at regional level. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1
percent levels denoted by *, **, *** , resp.
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